
I just reread Gore Vidal's
Perpetual War for Perpetual Peace: How We Got to Be So Hated, and I'm glad-sorry I did. I'm glad because it's a potent reminder of America's hidden obsession since 1947 for preemptive state terror in developing nations; we need to keep this obsession squarely on our radar now, even though the corporate-sponsored media rarely encourages us to do so. I'm sorry I read it because it's depressing to read the book in the current political climate, faced with Obama's fresh promise to escalate our presence in Afghanistan. Some of the Bush folks, angry at W for stirring up trouble in Afghanistan and then walking out, are happy to see Obama taking up Bush's cudgel again. That's depressing, right?
So why did I reread Vidal's little book? Because in a previous post, I'd stumbled on the phrase "strategic reassurance," a phrase debuted by Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg on September 29 to describe our new relationship with China. (The first use of the phrase occurs in the ninth paragraph, if you want to cut to the chase.) The new policy announcement was largely ignored by the media, of course, but "strategic reassurance" stands behind Obama's refusal to meet with His Holiness. And I figured Vidal would re-kindle a healthy measure of intelligent mistrust in all announcements from the federal government, and I was right. Having finished Vidal, I felt intelligently mistrustful all over again, and it was invigorating, particularly when it came to understanding "strategic reassurance."
The phrase means that we need to avoid embarrassing China by pointing to the
human rights violations that it silently chalks up to the price of becoming a super-power in the modern world. And the unspoken proviso underlying the announcement is equally clear: we need to avoid this embarrassment because we're up to our neck in Chinese debt ($800 billion). When Steinberg does begin to talk about a few of the problems that China's energy-acquiring foreign policy has created, he does so in oddly circumspect terms: "The problem is not just that China's mercantilist approach disrupts markets; it also leads China to problematic engagement with actors like Iran, Sudan, Burma, and Zimbabwe, and undermines the perception of China as country interested in contributing to regional stability and humanitarian goals."
And so countries become "actors;" genocide is "problematic engagement;" and China runs the risk of not being perceived as a country interested in "regional stability." The cardinal sin here is "disrupting markets." And of course Tibet is never mentioned.
Here's the deal. The policy of "strategic reassurance" makes a kind of sense to a kind of world I feel less and less willing to understand: let's talk about the things we agree on--making money--and forget those we claim to disagree on--human rights. (Remember Secretary of State Clinton's February announcement that economic issues will trump human rights in our negotiations with China.)
And O yes, a side-note from Steinberg to President Obama: do not meet with the Dalai Lama, and I won't mention his name or his country, as I catalogue China's "problematic engagements" in the announcement of our new policy.
The new policy seems to be working. China, at least, felt reassured by Steinberg's announcement of "strategic reassurance."
On Tuesday, October 20, about three weeks after Steinberg's proclamation, Chinese authorities executed four Tibetans in Lhasa for their participation in the 2008 protests against the Chinese occupation of their country.
It wasn't reported in the major American news outlets.